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bstract: I am going to concentrate my concern on the discussion of the 
diversification of the existing world currency system, because in the view 
of the majority of Chinese economists it is closely linked to the future 
directions and destinations of China’s domestic financial reform, to China’s 
policies regarding Asia’s financial collaborations, and to the positioning of RMB 
in the world in the coming years. It is almost commonly accepted among Chinese 
economists that China is on the way to form its international financial strategies 
that contain three objectives: properly re-visiting the Bretton Woods system in 
today’s context, actively pushing foreward the region-wide financial cooperation 
of an Asian single currency as a core, and gradually internalizing RMB. 
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Today, the world is plagued by the financial crisis which started two years ago in 
the United States. Different from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the current 
one occurred in the most developed economy of the world and spread 
contagiously to the rest of the globe. Despite the fact that recent data suggests 
some healing process after many sizeable stimulus packages taken by the 
decision-makers of major economies, it is still hard to expect for a really strong 
recovery.  
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AOne silver lining of the crisis comes from the fact that people began to look 
seriously for the causes of how the world’s financial system went wrong. 
Gradually, attention has been paid to the two pillars of the existing global 
financial framework. The first pillar is the global financial institutions such as IMF, 
World Bank, as well as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
and so on so forth. The current crisis has demonstrated that all the above-
mentioned international institutions are not fully capable of keeping the world’s 
financial system well functioning. Therefore, there are growing discussions about 
the ways of how to improve the functioning of those international financial 
institutions. However, my focus will exclusively touch upon the other pillar: the 
US dollar-dominated world currency system with the dollar acting as both 
transaction and reserve currency, and the last source of liquidity of the world. 
Years ago, there was a saying that the whole world but the US tries to produce 
everything which can be purchased in dollar while America’s major job is to print 
dollars. The words do tell somewhat truth although it is a little bit exaggerated. 
Here people would ask: How on earth can these happen?  
There are several factors explaining why the US dollar has played a dominant 
role worldwide in the past six decades. First of all, the world does need an 
international currency to facilitate trade and investment among economies. 
Secondly, America generates enormous GDP with the size as big as three times 
that of the second biggest economy in the world. Thirdly, the US has an efficient 
and flexible financial system with a deep and open financial market. Fourthly, the 
US dollar has been confronted with relatively weak competition from either euro 
or Japanese yen. Fifthly, the so-called network effect of the key currency has 
greatly helped dollar dominate the world currency system. Last but not least, the 
US dollar has been substantially backed up by the US superb political, military 
power, and the so-called soft power.  
Accumulatively, the USD-dominated global financial system has become 
problematic when people began to complain that the Fed monetary and dollar 
policies have been usually formulated in the US interest while paying little 
attention to the welfare of the rest of the world. At the same time, people turn to 
be less confident in the US financial system due to its ill regulation and get 
increasingly worried about the future value of the dollar caused by the US 
unprecedented expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. As a result, a sort of 
consensus has been reached: the ongoing crisis is providing the world with a 
good chance to get the eroded global financial framework fixed. For instance, we could create a supra sovereign reserve currency, a warmly 
echoed proposal made by China’s Central Bank governor Mr. Zhou Xiaochuan in 
March 2009. We could also take measures to strengthen global financial 
oversight, to enhance the regional financial cooperation, and to promote 
diversification of international currency system. 
Here I am going to concentrate my concern on the discussion of the 
diversification of the existing world currency system, because in the view of the 
majority of Chinese economists, it is closely linked to the future directions and 
destinations of China’s domestic financial reform, to China’s policies regarding 
Asia’s financial collaborations, and to the positioning of RMB in the world in the 
coming years.  
What I am going to talk about will be based on the researches conducted by 
Chinese economists who are very much concerned about the future role of RMB 
in Asia and in the world. Having carefully studied more than fifty papers or 
articles, I found that the majority of them seem to believe that a post-dollar era is 
not only likely but also has been on the horizon. During the period between 2010 
and 2030 humankind would witness a tri-polar international currency system with 
USD and EURO and an Asian united currency or one of the Asian economies’ 
currencies as three foundations.  
The hopeful, if not a wishful, tri-polar international currency system could 
probably bring about benefits for the world as a whole in ways of helping to 
reduce the systemic risk of the international financial system, to discipline the 
policy makers of those countries whose currencies are key currencies, to restore 
the balance between real economy and money economy, and to lower 
transaction costs when people do business across the borders. 
It is almost commonly accepted among Chinese economists that China is on the 
way to form its international financial strategies which contain the following three 
objectives: properly re-visiting the Bretton Woods system in today’s context, 
actively pushing forward the region-wide financial cooperation with the creation 
of an Asian single currency as the core, and gradually internationalizing RMB. 
Here, the last two objectives are closely relevant to what I am concerned with. 
Since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the countries in this 
region have made many progresses in cooperating with each other. For the 
purposes of avoiding another financial crisis and protecting their economies from 
collapsing when outside shocks arrive, people in Asia tried to advance 
cooperation in many ways. They used to think about establishing an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF), they worked out the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) by following the steps of the European Currency Unit (ECU), they created the Asian 
Bond Fund (ABF), they put the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) into effect, they 
enlarged CMI and made it a multilateral instead of a bilateral mechanism by 
setting up a reserve pool. Besides, they discussed in depth the possibilities of 
coordinating each country’s monetary and exchange rate policies, and some of 
them put forth an ultimate goal for Asian currency collaboration and named the 
future Asian single currency ASIRO.  
When Chinese economists talk about the future Asian key currency or 
currencies, there emerge two possible destinations: number one, a Euro-like 
unified Asian currency represents Asia to join the tri-polar global currency 
system; number two, RMB represents Asia to join the tri-polar global currency 
system with Japanese yen acting as a foil to RMB. Accordingly, there are three 
choices facing China: to firmly enhance the regional cooperation aiming at the 
creation of an Asian single currency; or to strongly expedite the process of 
making RMB one of the international key currencies; or by taking a long-term 
view, to deeply involve in the region-wide cooperation conducive to RMB 
internationalization in the long run.  
Now let me elaborate the possible roadmaps of RMB internationalization planned 
by some Chinese economists. Step one: making RMB a pricing currency. Step 
two: making RMB a settlement currency. Step three: making RMB a reserve 
currency. From the geographical perspective, RMB would better go international 
sequentially to HK and Taiwan first, then to the neighboring areas, then to the 
region, and finally to the globe. The whole process of RMB internationalization, 
as they estimate, will take 15-30 years. 
Why the majority of Chinese economists are in favor of RMB internationalization? 
Apart from the facts that China’s relative economic influence has increased 
significantly along with the financial crisis and some wishful seigniorage may 
accrue from it, the reasons they give can be roughly summarized as follows:  
The first reason is that China should play a financial role which is proportionate 
to its economic weights both in Asia and in the world. China’s GDP accounts for 
6.8% of the world total in 2008 calculated in market exchange rate, its exports 
and imports make up 9% and 8% of the world total respectively in 2008 with its 
trade dependency as high as 70%. However, more than 90% of China’s imports 
and exports are priced and settled in US dollars while the share of RMB as 
reserve currency in the world is nearly zero. Justin Lin, the World Bank chief 
economist estimated earlier this year that China’s economic output in PPP would 
surpass the U.S. in 2020 and become the largest economy in the world. Angus Maddison, a prominent expert on economic historic statistics, forecasted the time 
when China exceeds the U.S. in terms of output in PPP would be 2015. By 
market exchange rate China is very likely to become the second biggest 
economy in the world in 2009 thanks to a possible 5% economic contraction of 
Japan. All of those figures have shown a contrasting gap between China’s 
meaningful economic weights and its meaningless financial influence, which 
ought to be narrowed down. 
Secondly, the domestic market-oriented reform can gain extra firepower by pushing 
forward RMB internationalization. History tells us that for any successful currency 
internationalization several preconditions need to be met. This means that China’s 
exchange rate policy should become more flexible, its interest rate mechanism 
should be more market-based, the pace of fully opening up its capital account 
should be accelerated, its financial market should be further liberalized, and China 
should do much more to upgrade its financial regulation and macro monetary policy 
making. China’s entry into WTO has already set a very good example of this kind. 
The third point they make is that people are becoming less and less patient 
because the Asian financial cooperation moved forward so slowly that its future 
is getting bleaker and bleaker. They listed the obstacles that hindered the 
financial cooperation in this region: similarities of each country’s economic and 
trade structure; lack of political trust among Asian economies, especially among 
bigger ones; unsupportive or even negative reactions of the US, the failure of 
establishing the Asian Monetary Fund is a typical example of this kind; 
reluctance for most Asian countries to concede their monetary sovereignty as the 
Euro Area members ever did; difficulties in allocating weights to various 
economies with contrasting size and growth momentum when devising and 
scheduling the possible currency or monetary collaborations. Naturally, the fact 
that the foreign exchange reserves in this region since 1997 Asian financial crisis 
have substantially increased is regarded as a strong support of their arguments.  
The fourth reason why they support RMB internationalization is relating to the 
establishment of a more balanced and stable global financial system. An 
internationalized RMB could help provide a new investment tool for the world, 
could help dilute the financial or currency risks, could help constrain the global 
dominant currency or currencies from behaving irresponsibly, could help pave 
the way for incorporating RMB into SDR reserves basket, and could help 
strengthen financial collaboration in Asia. In one word, RMB internationalization 
will be conducive to global financial stability and development. The fifth advocating point comes from the judgment that China’s financial and 
banking situation has been much improved and will continue to get more mature 
and sophisticated. Today, all eighteen major commercial banks in China have 
satisfied the minimum capital requirement of 8 percent, while 5 years ago, we had 
only 8 banks that met that requirement. The ratio of non-performing loans of major 
commercial banks has reduced to 2.4% in 2008, compared to the figures of 20% 
nine years ago. China has already introduced QFII and QDII and is on the way to 
expand them continuously. The treasury bonds market and stock markets in China 
are becoming much deeper and more flexible along with the budgetary revenue 
being on rise dramatically. Meanwhile, China’s gigantic foreign exchange reserves 
(US$ 2.1 trillion in March 2009) is a reliable guarantee for those who would hold 
RMB as official reserves or invest in RMB denominated assets.  
The last reason for promoting RMB internationalization lies in the fact that it is 
somehow a result of a natural process which has already begun. Nowadays, 
RMB is spontaneously circulated in HK and other neighboring economies, and it 
has become one of payment or settlement currencies in Vietnam, Thailand and 
Pakistan. RMB saving accounts are available in Chinese Taiwan, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Korea. China’s central bank 
has so far signed currency swap agreements valued RMB650 billion with the 
financial authorities of Korea, HK, Belarus, Malaysia, Argentina and Indonesia. 
There are evidences showing that some Asian economies have more or less 
targeted RMB as an invisible currency anchor. One recent meaningful policy 
measure is that China made experiments of the cross-border trade RMB 
settlement in Shanghai and four cities in Guangdong province in April 2009.  
In today’s China, RMB Internationalization is really a subject under heated debate. 
Those who oppose RMB internationalization in general and a sudden and quick 
one in particular thoughtfully stated that the preconditions for it are far from being 
mature. For the time being and in the near future both China’s economic aggregate 
and non-economic influence is not big enough. There are many domestic obstacles 
or hurdles that may hinder China’s long-term growth and do make those rosy 
pictures about China’s future not look that bright. It is true that a convertible RMB 
might be indispensable for a currency’s internationalization. But it is by no means 
an easy task for China to entirely open up its capital account. It is commonly 
accepted that currency convertibility remains as a two-edged weapon. As far as 
exchange rate is concerned, nobody fully knows the consequences when RMB 
freely floats according to market demand and supply, let alone the fierce bargaining 
over exchange rate policy among different vested interest groups. Here, what they 
try to clarify is that China has a long way to go to catch up with the developed economies in respect of the sophistication and size of the financial market, of 
financial regulation, and of macro monetary management. 
In the eyes of those who disagree to internationalizing RMB, the efforts to do so 
run in the opposite direction to regional cooperation. Saying so is not only 
because regional cooperation becomes trendy in today’s world, but also because 
only a united Asia can survive the fierce competition and eventually emerges as 
the third pole of the future tri-polar world. By referring to the successful 
experiences of the Euro history, and by drawing lessons from the Asian financial 
cooperation in the past decades, they remain confident that Asian peoples will 
definitely find a win-win solution to move towards an Asian currency by 
deepening their financial collaboration. 
The experiences of yen internationalization are not supportive for internationa-
lization of a sovereign country’s currency. Based on various researches, a number 
of Chinese economists come to conclusions that at least five factors contribute to 
the failure of yen internationalization: high level of dollarization in Asia, which 
means that partially substituting the widely used dollar may increase the 
transaction costs; Japan’s huge trade surplus with its Asian trade partners, which 
made its Asian trade partners difficult to hold yen-denominated assets; dramatic 
fluctuation of the exchange rate between yen and dollar, which made other Asian 
economies skeptical of yen’s credibility; Japan’s bilateralism in trade and exchange 
rate policy; backlash from the US because yen internationalization would be 
detrimental to one of the core interests of the United States. 
There would be some unfavorable aftermath caused by currency internationa-
lization. The so called Triffin Dilemma is one of the well-known unwanted 
consequences, then comes the so called Trilemma, which means there is no 
way to simultaneously keep exchange rate stable, capital movement free, and 
monetary policy independent. Counteraction resulting from challenging the 
vested interest groups just as Japan met with decades ago should be seriously 
taken into account by China. More fluctuation in exchange rate and assets prices 
could be brought about in large part by hot money or massive speculations, and 
a potential long-term pressure on RMB to appreciate may result from the 
increasing overseas demand for RMB. All of the above-mentioned negative 
impacts might lead to social-political instability in China. 
For the time being China is standing at the crossroad: either to let RMB go 
international independently, aiming at making RMB one of the world’s key 
currencies, or to spare no efforts to make RMB play an indispensable role in the 
process of Asian financial collaboration. Although at present Chinese economists seem overwhelmingly to be on the side of internationalizing RMB, I am myself of 
the opinion that the direction and destination of RMB will be highly path-
dependent. Any changes in the policies of foreign governments, any 
developments of global market’s preference for payment and reserve currencies, 
any improvements or deteriorations in the domestic financial market in China, 
among other things, may exert vital impact upon the determining the directions or 
courses of the RMB’s future movement. No matter which direction or course 
China is going to take, the changes in the role played by RMB will definitely be a 
historical event for the world financial or currency system in general, and for 
China and its neighboring economies in particular. 
 